Abstract : | The purpose of this thesis is to present the benefits of supermodularity in economicanalysis. We introduce the essential lattice theoretical tools. Furthermore, we exhibitTopkis' Monotonicity Theorem in Monotone Comparative Statics. Then we elaborateon non-cooperative supermodular games, the existence of Nash equilibria in them andthe presentation of players' rationalizability. The cornerstone of this work is the fourthchapter where we state some results regarding sequences of supermodular games. Asshown such sequences converge to a supermodular limit-game. Additionally, not onlydo we prove that the set of accumulation points of a sequence of Nash equilibria is asubset of the set of Nash equilibria in the supermodular limit-game but we also provethat it composes a complete sublattice of the latter. Therefore, we actually proposean equilibrium refinement rule regarding the Nash equilibria in the supermodular limitgame.
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