| Περίληψη : | The motivation for this thesis stems from an eagerness to understand and to learn how political regimes really work, what the implications of each one are, and from a desire to broaden the knowledge on the subject. This branch of political economy is associated both with the mathematical part of economic sciences, as well as the sociological and human behavioral part; something that has been with us since human beings began to organize themselves into communities. This dissertation is divided into five sections. The first section begins with a brief historical introduction to the topic. In the second section, theoretical considerations will be explored, introducing essential concepts for a thorough examination on the topic and establishing a theoretical frame of reference, as well as addressing the main problems and difficulties that arise for both political regimes. The third section is Preliminary Literature. A comprehensive examination on the research done by different authors on democracies and autocracies will be accomplished, as well as on fiscal policy. The first part of this section focuses on how government is able to reduce income inequality through taxation and public spending as a function of political regime. The second part concentrates on comparing the different mechanics and functioning of autocracies and democracies from an institutional and practical point of view. The third part focuses on discretionary fiscal policies and fiscal adjustment. Finally, the last part will discuss public debt and its sustainability. This concludes the review of previous work, and the fourth section of this dissertation begins: The methodology. I will start with a description of the databases used, their sources, and how the data have been used for the statistical analysis. Then, I will specify empirical strategy. In order to test the hypothesis of whether the best autocracies outperform the best democracies, I will formulate the different mathematical models and define how the analysis will proceed. Essentially, it consists of four parts: A main model, and the isolated analysis of the four areas of fiscal policy: fiscal structure on growth, the ability to follow counter-cyclical fiscal policies, debt sustainability, and the ability to reduce income inequality. After an initial analysis, the next step is to present the results of the regressions and econometric analyses. The empirical results indicate that the top autocracies adopt two fiscal policies that outperform those of the top democracies. Specifically, they exhibit a greater ability to implement counter-cyclical fiscal policies accurately and demonstrate improved debt management. Conversely, the top democracies excel in decreasing income inequality. The last part of this section is a brief sensitivity analysis. The fifth and last part of this thesis is the conclusions of the research. In the first part of this dissertation we will look in depth at different concepts and realizations. We will see if Churchill's words were right: "Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others". We will discover that autocracies are a highly volatile gamble. We will study concepts such as the logic of power, how civil society can be weak or empowered and its implications for politics. We will look at the tax sweet spot, and in which political system it tends to be highest. We will look at the key factors for prosperity, as well as how individual rights may not be a luxury. We will investigate why the stationary bandit prefers prosperity, the concept of the encompassing interest, and how the Coase theorem applies to politics. In addition, we will reflect on the power of the accountability role in politics, and how this concept is not necessarily restricted to democracies, as well as the importance of the time horizon. In the second part of this thesis we will be able to discover empirically how democracies and autocracies perform in different areas of fiscal policy. Furthermore, we will analyse in depth how successful political systems do so in practice, in order to answer the research question: Do successful autocracies undertake fiscal policies that outperform top democracies?"
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