| Περίληψη : | The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the process of European monetary integration taking into account the interaction of economics and politics during that process. Topics of high interest remain how the fragility of the system forces institutional changes, how political and economic actors coordinate, how the distinction between fiscal and monetary policies worked out, how the crisis challenges both the economic and the political theories of European Integration, which institutional and structural reforms do the heterogeneous monetary union need and whether the Euro is a buffer against or a contributing factor to crises. Among others we examine the impact of the Euro crisis on the governance framework as well as the concepts underpinning it. We adopt a dualistic approach regarding the European Economic Governance before and after the crisis of 2010. We gather all relevant arguments concerning the completion or fragility of each framework and we evaluate the sufficiency of the latest reforms of the economic Governance post 2010. Furthermore, we elaborate on the new rationale of the EMU compared to the founding principles that motivated it originally. Taking into account the evolvement of the ECB we extensively examine its role and whether it worked in a positive or negative manner through a comparative perspective considering the differentiated interests and characteristics of a series of Eurozone countries.
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