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Title :Essays in competition economics and the enforcement of competition policy
Creator :Bageri, Vasiliki
Contributor :Katsoulakos, Ioannis (Degree granting institution)
Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics (Degree granting institution)
Type :Text
Extent :112p.
Language :en
Abstract :Briefly the structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 serves as an introductory note and presents an extensive review of the economic theory of competition law enforcement and antitrust penalties. Initially, we consider the relevant literature and summarize the basic approaches that led to the introduction of economic analysis in criminal law in general, and then we concentrate on competition law in particular. We continue by presenting the antitrust legislation adopted by the United States and the European Union and examine their enforcement regime. We then describe in detail the methodology used for calculating fines by the major competition authorities in the US and EU. Finally, we present a number of alternative approaches that challenge the present methodology of calculating fines and suggest new ways to achieve a more efficient enforcement of competition law while minimizing social welfare loss.Chapter 2 addresses the highly debated issue among antitrust practitioners on how competition authorities (CAs) should set fines and how they actually do so in practice. In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple models to characterize their comparative static properties, and quantify them with simulations based on market data. We conclude by discussing the obvious need to depart from these distortive rules of thumb that appear to have the potential to substantially reduce social welfare.Chapter 3 proposes a simple new quantitative methodology that can be used to determine optimal fines, taking into account both restitutive and dissuasive elements. The methodology is used to derive simple formulas on the basis of which an Authority can derive optimal fines, or the likely range of such fines, using information on the price overcharge caused by an action, the intensity of competition in the but-for situation, the size of efficiencies and a large number of other considerations that authorities take into account when setting fines. These considerations include the size of the detection rate, decision errors, desistance and various other aggravating and mitigating factors.Chapter 4 studies the role of the size of extant market power as a predictor of the size of the reduction in welfare generated by anticompetitive actions. In particular, we concentrate on monopolization or abuse of dominance cases in which an exclusionary action by the dominant firm eliminates one of the rival firms. We emphasize the point that the source of market power is important in understanding how changes in the size of extant market power affect the size of the reduction in welfare, distinguishing between Consumer Surplus and Total Welfare, generated by anticompetitive actions. We also discuss the relationship between the degree of extant market power and market share and the extent to which market share can be a reliable indicator of the change in welfare induced by anti-competitive conduct.
Subject :Competition Policy Enforcement
Antitrust penalties
Extant market power
Date :30-09-2015
Licence :

File: Bageri_2015.pdf

Type: application/pdf