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Communication games and the revelation principle in supply chain management
(2015-10-12) Zissis, Dimitris; Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of Management Science and Technology; Burnetas, Apostolos; Tarantilis, Christos D.; Mourtos, Yiannis; Kritikos, Emmanouil; Androutsopoulos, Konstantinos; Repoussis, Panagiotis; Ioannou, George
The aim of this PhD dissertation is the in-depth study of supply chain and how the nodes could coordinate their strategies in a decentralized system. We provide the nodes the opportunity to communicate with each other, without any restrictions. Therefore, we propose a “free'' communication system, including all the possible ways of communication among the nodes, and examine how communication leads to the system-wide coordination and, thus, reduces costs, eliminates inefficiencies, and results in better individual profits for all the participants. We study supply chains with rational nodes, which have to make private decisions in order to maximize their utility functions. These decisions are related to the order quantity, quantity discounts, product prices, inventory levels, etc. Furthermore, these decisions are usually competitive, because every node has different preferences and different information. However, there are cases in which some nodes have incentives to build a coalition; therefore they act as a single entity. As each node is a distinct decision maker and has private information and different preferences, we model the supply chain as a game using tools of Game Theory. Our core objective is to examine how each node decides on his strategy in a decentralized system.An increasing body of literature in the area of Supply Chain Management addresses the way in which the nodes of a chain can act in a cross-linked mode, in order to reduce both their own costs and the total cost of the chain. Key research work has been published in premier archival journals tackling problems associated with supply chain coordination; however, examination of the recent literature reveals that almost all the papers have restrictive (e.g., sign of contracts) or unrealistic assumptions (e.g., all the nodes possess the same information). Thus, there are many open issues deserving attention. It would be ideal if we could propose ways of coordination without restrictive and unrealistic assumptions to align the individual incentives of the nodes with the incentives of the whole chain.In this regard, we allow nodes to communicate with each other; with respect to any private information they may possess. Obviously, opportunities for mutual benefits cannot be found, unless the nodes share their private information. To proceed in sharing private information, nodes should be provided with appropriate incentives. It is worth to investigate how information sharing could be achieved. We consider that all the possibilities for communication are assumed to be entirely controlled by a mediator. The fundamental idea is the framework proposed by Gibbard (1973) and Myerson (1979, 1982), the Revelation Principle. The extended Revelation Principle's framework, by Myerson, Hurwicz, and Maskin, was awarded the 2007 Nobel Prize in economics. Intuitively, the Revelation Principle states that the mediator could design a mechanism to enforce all the nodes to reveal their private information and obey his suggestions about their actions, because it is in their self-interest. Therefore, by using credible mediator, coordination is attainable.