Διδακτορικές διατριβές

Μόνιμο URI για αυτήν τη συλλογήhttps://pyxida.aueb.gr/handle/123456789/34

Περιήγηση

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Α Β Γ Δ Ε Ζ Η Θ Ι Κ Λ Μ Ν Ξ Ο Π Ρ Σ Τ Υ Φ Χ Ψ Ω

Τώρα δείχνει 1 - 2 από 2

The effects of IFRS on investment decisions
(07-03-2018) Kapellas, Konstantinos A.; Καπέλλας, Κωνσταντίνος Α.; Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of Accounting and Finance; Ghicas, Dimitrios; Ballas, Apostolos; Papadaki, Afroditi; Xevas, Dimosthenis; Demirakos, Efthimios; Tzovas, Christos; Siougle, Georgia
This thesis studies the relation between the financial reporting framework after IFRS adoption and investment decisions. This thesis is structured around three parts the first part (1st) contains academic literature review in the area of financial reporting practices and investment decisions and the second part (2nd) in the area of the effects of IFRS adoption (the change in financial reporting system) on investment management. The third part (3rd) of this thesis is the empirical research on the effects of IFRS adoption in investment decisions in terms of financial reporting quality, cost of equity capital, return on invested capital, and level of new investments. Additionally the third part studies the effects under crisis and non-crisis economic conditions. The empirical research is focused on European evidence and especially on Eurozone countries.The motivation of this research is based on that corporate investment is a fundamental determinant for future sustainability and growth. The extent to which IFRS adoption does affect corporate investment is essential to our understanding of how financial reporting impact real economic activity and especially focusing on investments on operating assets.
Voluntary Management Forecasts: Implications on Financial Reporting Quality
Chronopoulos, Panagiotis I.; Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of Accounting and Finance; Siougle, Georgia
The start of the millennium was marked by the information technology bubble and high profile financial scandals which put under examination the existing financial reporting regulation frame. Regulation Fair Disclosure (2000) and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) were enforced as reaction to the vulnerable, as it was proved eventually, regulated environment for corporate financial reporting. More specifically, Reg FD (2000) aimed to prohibit firms from selectively releasing material information to individuals, such as institutional investors or analysts, under the scope of avoiding the likelihood to “… trade on the basis of material nonpublic information …” (SEC 2000). Towards the same direction, SOX (2002) aimed to improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures by promoting corporate responsibility and management accountability, by imposing great penalties for managerial misconduct. Corporate information is of seminal importance for the opposing forces of demand and supply for a company’s shares within a capital market. Financial reporting information has been attributed the important role of mitigating the information gap, derived from these paration of ownership and management. Capital providers demand access to corporate information for valuation reasons. In order to distinguish between high profitable or growth firms and less profitable or declining ones, reported financial figures are essential inputs for their analysis process. Lack of adequate and useful information may result in mispricing of firms’ value and eventually in resource misallocation, within the capital market. Furthermore, financial information is valuable for stewardship reasons. Granted the management motivation to withhold private information (Verrecchia 2001), the regulation of mandatory guidelines for the release of such private information, as it was enforced through Reg FD(2000), and the promotion of management accountability against penalties in cases of misconduct, as it was enforced through SOX (2002), operate towards the direction of enhancing information efficiency and optimizing resource allocation for financing purposes. Beyer (2010) argues that information environment is shaped according to three basic pillars: a) mandatory disclosures as regulated by supervisory authorities, b) analyst opinions as formed through the financial or technical analysis implemented based on the available information and c) managers’ voluntary disclosures. Disclosure regulation through Reg FD(2000) and SOX (2002) is directly affiliated to the first shaping pillar, the mandatory disclosures. Nevertheless, through the enforcement of communication boundaries to the top management, such regulation is witnessed to have impacted the other two pillars, i.e. managers and analysts, indirectly (Zhang et al 2003, Herrmann et al 2008). The dissertation focuses its analysis on the third pillar, the management voluntary disclosures. The basic key element of my motivation is the information content of management forecasts, as it is supposed to exist since they are provided by the most affiliated parties, to the company, the management team. As the timeline shows, voluntary management disclosures are published well after (B) the release of previous year’s historical accounting figures (A) and well before the publication of current year’s accounting figures (C). Thus the new information, that is not contained in historical numbers and is not presented until the publication of current numbers, remains unutilized. Furthermore, the specific pillar of information environment, i.e. management forecasts under Reg FD (2000) and SOX (2002) frame, is the less investigated area within the disclosure environment, compared to analyst forecasts, and the most growing one, in terms of new firms adopting voluntary disclosure activity (Bailey 2003, Nichols 2009).The dissertation develops arguments on the direction that the Reg FD (2000), mainly, and SOX (2002), secondly, have forced significant changes on the field of voluntary disclosures and it seeks to investigate them. Management voluntary disclosures are described as management forecasts/guidance, since managers make forecasts about future economic incidents’ outcomes and provide estimations for the basic accounting figures of the following years. Since management forecasts are delivered from top management, which has access to company inside information and forms corporate strategic decisions, it is asserted that they enclose significant information valuable to external users, mainly to capital providers, for the capital investment decisions. For this reason I apply my research on management forecasts in an attempt, first to verify the value of their content, secondly to draw implications for the interesting parties and third to identify whether and to what degree do the market participants respond to their voluntary provision by the manager. The dissertation focuses on the performance figures delivered through financial reporting, i.e. sales and earnings. I treat them as performance benchmarks capturing significant amount of investors’ attention (King et al 1990) and build the hypotheses around their impact on the market participants’ perception. The dissertation attempts to provide answers to specific questions within the topic of management forecasts. Specifically, I examine corporate voluntary disclosure practice and provide supporting evidence to the following matters: a) Does forecasting activity draw implications for reporting quality? b) Does forecasting profile (optimistic versus pessimistic management forecasts) draw implications for reporting quality? c) Does the market recognize (efficiently price) the implications drawn from the existence of forecasting activity and manager’s forecasting profile? d) Are management forecasts valuable towards beating the information asymmetry? Except from the above topics I extend the analysis further, on the analysis of accruals. The dissertation proposes, estimates and tests for market efficiency a new accrual measure, the Incremental accruals. Incremental accruals are estimated as the difference between Forecasted accruals and Historical accruals. Our proposed forecasted accruals model derives from a different version of the forward looking model (Dechow 2003) adjusted with the inclusion of a forecasting variable, the management sales forecasts. As a result, the traditional forward looking model (Dechow 2003) transforms from an a posteriori decomposition accrual model into an a priori forecasting accrual model. In order to draw conclusions for the above research questions and collect supporting evidence for my research, I conduct the analysis of management forecasts under three basic scopes: a) Materiality: referring to the magnitude of the forecasted figure in terms of statistical significance. b) Existence: referring to the fact that a forecast is provided or not. c) Profile: referring to forecast’s comparison with the actual figure reported in the yearend, i.e. optimistic or pessimistic. The sample consists of US capital market data and especially concentrates on S&P 500Composite Index constituents for the years 2006-2012. For the analysis I collected historical accounting data, analyst estimations and management forecasts. I collected historical accounting data from Compustat. Management and analyst forecasting data were hand collected from Thomson Reuters. I limited the sample period to 2006 and after years, since it was the earliest year that there were available forecast data in Thomson Reuters1. The dissertation is organized and presented through three separate, in terms of hypotheses and research design, but consecutive, in terms of conclusions, sections: Section 1 deals with the matters of forecast materiality and forecast profile. First I document that management forecasts operate as unique benchmarks of manager’s estimations. The analysis is concentrated on range forecasts, as provided through upper and lower limits, by the manager. I document that range forecast bounds are significant numbers, rather than naïve estimations, whose importance needs further analysis. Second, I confirm that forecasting profile should operate as a signal for investors. The results support that forecasting activity is mainly optimistically biased in accordance with previous literature’s findings (Libby et al 2012, Myers et al 2013). Third, I conclude that forecast profile should signal accuracy implications to the related parties. Pessimistic forecast attitude, on behalf of the manager, is proven more accurate and reliable relative to optimistic one. The initial conclusions of Section 1 support the view that a) management forecasts do have information content, thus their existence should operate as signal to the market, and b) forecasting profile is meaningful, thus forecasting attitude encloses implications for related parties, as well. Section 2 extends the analysis on the field of reporting quality. Having concluded that management forecast existence and profile enclose valuable information, we attempt to identify such value. I assert persistence of accounting figures as the indicator of reporting quality, in accordance with previous literature (Richardson et al 2005, Dechow et al 2003). I calculate persistence for earnings figure and its components, operating cash flows and accruals. First I examine persistence changes under the scope of management forecast existence. I divide the sample into forecasting firms (Forecasters) and non-forecasting firms (non Forecasters) and test for differences of persistence levels between the groups. Second I examine persistence changes under the scope of management forecast profile. I divide the sample into optimistic firms (Optimists) and pessimistic firms (Pessimists) and test for differences of persistence levels between the groups. I conclude significant differences of persistence levels for both the pairs Forecasters – non Forecasters and Optimists – Pessimists for earnings figures. An important finding is that the differing earnings persistence levels, as confirmed by the tests conducted, result from the accrual component rather than the cash component of earnings. Finally, I examine whether market participants are aware of the differing persistence levels of accrual component, as implied from both the existence of a management forecast and its forecasting profile. The results present efficient, nevertheless marginal, pricing of the above firm characteristics, i.e. for Forecasters and Pessimists, regarding the accrual component of earnings, implying that there is ground for further implications’ absorption on behalf of the market. Section 3 presents the new incremental accrual indicator. Having identified the accrual component as the source of reporting quality variations between the groups of Forecasters and non Forecasters and having witnessed market’s ability to recognize and price such variation, I attempt to further understand the implications of the accrual component for earnings. I built on previous literature’s forward looking accrual model (Dechow et al 2003)in order to obtain an alternative calculation base for accruals. Particularly, first I enrich the information content of historical accruals, calculated as the difference of operating cash flows from net income, by estimating a new measure of accruals with the inclusion, in the forward looking model (Dechow 2003), of one year ahead sales forecasts, voluntarily disclosed by firms’ management. I name the alternative version of accruals as forecasted accruals. Forecasted accruals, due to their nature, i.e. they derive as a combination of a) previous year’s reported accounting figures and b) voluntarily released next year’s forecasted figures, can be estimated well in advance the calculation of the actual accruals, i.e. at the official release of actual yearend accounting figures. Thus I transform forward looking model into a forecasting model rather than an ex post accrual decomposition model. Second I use the forecasted accruals to estimate an incremental component over historical accruals in an attempt to isolate the new information content that a management forecast encloses over and above the already utilized information content of actual reported figures (historical figures). I foresee in that incremental component to explain management forecast errors, i.e. to help to reduce uncertainty. Finally, I investigate if the incremental accrual component is efficiently priced by the market. The results conclude that the proposed forecasted accruals are calculated significantly lower than the historical accruals, confirming initial assertion that voluntary management forecasts enclose new information helpful to mitigate information gap. Further I present evidence that incremental accrual component operates in the direction of uncertainty reduction since it is negatively associated to management forecast errors. As far as market reaction is concerned, I conclude that market participants recognize, though marginally, the additional information value of the incremental component. The current research offers significant contribution to the existing research. First, it highlights the materiality of forecast bounds, in the case of range forecasts. Upper and lower forecast limits enclose significant information and should be examined separately within the terms of an analysis procedure. Second, it highlights the importance of voluntary disclosure activity and forecasting profile as influencing variables for reporting quality and transparency. Evident voluntary disclosure activity and managers’ forecasting direction have effect on the persistence and accuracy of accounting figures. Third, it stresses accrual component’s importance for interpreting high persistence levels that accompany voluntary disclosure activity. Fourth, it emphasizes the importance of voluntary management disclosures in assessing firm performance. Finally, it generates an incremental component of accruals that incorporates part of the unrealized business performance voluntarily disclosed by firms’ management and operates as an informative indicator for stock returns prediction. I believe that my research draws significant implications for market participants, regulators and researchers. Market participants could consider including the existence or not of management guidance into their perception, in order to improve their predictive ability for future performance. Further, investors could consider estimating incremental accruals when voluntary sales forecasts are released and improve their investment decisions. Regulators should further consider the implications that forecasting activity encloses and take analogous actions by endorsing voluntarily disclosed forecasting activity. The encouragement of voluntary disclosures could lead to an improvement in the diffusion of value relevant information in an increasing uncertain economic environment. Finally, researchers could reexamine the already drawn literature conclusions for management forecasts, under the scope of forecasting profile and discrete forecast bounds. Future research should focus on the isolation and valuation of voluntary disclosures’ information content, over and above the mandatory reported figures, probably extending the research field to include more voluntary reported figures such as capital expenditures and operating cash flows.

Περιήγηση

Πλοήγηση Διδακτορικές διατριβές ανά Επιβλέπων "Siougle, Georgia"