Competition Policy: exploitative abuse of dominant position in the form of excessive pricing

Abstract

The present dissertation discusses exploitative abuses of dominance in the form of excessive pricing under Article 82 of the EC Treaty. First, the concepts of dominance, relevant market and abuse of dominance are introduced. Exploitative abuse of dominance is then defined and analyzed through the study of the European case law. After establishing the theoretical economic background supporting the rationale against excessive pricing, we point out the practical difficulties of assessing an excessive price through paradigms from the case law, and relevant critiques found in the bibliography. Then we focus on the very nature of the markets where excessive pricing occurs. First, we try to answer the question whether excessive pricing should be condemned in a dynamically competitive environment. Then, we focus on the most common market structure met in the majority of excessive pricing cases brought before the Commission and the Court, which is that of a legal monopoly. We discuss the special characteristics of this market structure, and the relation between anti-trust law within it, and sectoral regulation. Finally, we try to place the concept of excessive pricing within the structure of oligopolistic markets. The last chapter of the dissertation briefly presents the Greek competition law on the subject of excessive pricing before the implementation of Article 82, as well as the Greek price regulation code, followed by data in some remaining price or profit regulated sectors of the Greek economy.